The British corporate network, 1904–1976 : revisiting the finance–industry relationship. by Wilson,  John F. et al.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
13 December 2018
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Wilson, John F. and Buchnea, Emily and Tilba, Anna (2018) 'The British corporate network, 19041976 :
revisiting the ﬁnanceindustry relationship.', Business history., 60 (6). pp. 779-806.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1080/00076791.2017.1333106
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor Francis in Business History on 07 Jun 2017, available
online:http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/00076791.2017.1333106.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
1 
The British corporate network, 1904-
1976: revisiting the finance-industry 
relationship 
The relationship between finance and industry in Britain has received substantial attention, largely 
focusing on the role played by clearing banks as lenders to industry. This article, through the use of a 
unique dataset detailing the composition of the British corporate network, aims to investigate the 
corporate connectivity of industry to banks but also, importantly, highlight the increasing presence of 
financial institutions other than banks in British business. Additionally, the position of these financial 
institutions within the network reflects the changes in patterns of ownership of British business 
through this period as institutional investors’ share of British companies increased. This changing 
position is further articulated by an analysis of network density over the period, providing critical 
insights into wider patterns in British business between 1904 and 1976. 
Keywords: Corporate Networks; Banking; Financial Sector; Industrial Sector; Institutional 
Investors; Directors 
Introduction 
Since the publication of the Macmillan report in 1931, the impact of British financial 
institutions on corporate performance has received substantial and largely critical attention, 
not least from business and banking historians.1 The core issue has centred on the so-called 
‘bank-industry divide’,2 while more recently the debate has spread to assessing the nature and 
extent of support provided by British financial institutions generally for domestic industry. 
The critique of banks was prompted by the deep slump in activity across many of the older 
industries after 1921 that precipitated a decline in Britain’s position in the global business 
landscape.3 Since commercial banks maintained the closest relationship to domestic industry, 
they came under scrutiny for the role they ought to play in this scenario.4 Based on these 
contemporary perceptions of ‘industrial malaise’ and the perceived responsibility of banks, 
numerous committees, reports and policies were convened and released to offer solutions. 
The Macmillan report was just one of many which aimed to rectify the so-called ‘divide’ and 
control financial sector behaviour.5 Although later in the twentieth century Lindgren noted 
that ‘the functional and organizational boundaries delimiting banks on the one hand and 
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manufacturing industry on the other, are becoming indistinct’,6 numerous historical 
evaluations have been conducted which provide varied explanations for the perceived and 
actual extent of the links between financial institutions and industrial investment and strategy. 
The recent work of Turner, Acheson et al. and Higgins et al. also demonstrates that the 
discussion of the shifting relationship between financial institutions and industrial companies 
is still highly relevant to the study of British business in the twentieth century.7  
This article will provide fresh perspectives on the debate about finance-industry 
relations by using a novel methodology of studying the inter-organisational relationships and 
corporate networks.8 Covering a period which started just after the concentration of British 
banking and finishing when financial institutions generally were regarded as highly 
influential within the British corporate network,9 and by using a database of board directors 
across the top 250 British companies based on net assets (200 non-financial and 50 financial, 
both listed and unlisted), it will be possible to demonstrate the level of contact between and 
within sectors.10 Four benchmark years (1904, 1938, 1958 and 1976) have been chosen, 
allowing the network to be viewed at different critical periods of change and development in 
British business. The data also allows for centrality measurement using the Freeman degree 
(which is the sum of the shortest paths from a singular node), indicating which companies were 
most connected within the network as a whole, as well as an examination of the composition 
of connections and what this might indicate about their inter- and intra-organizational 
activity.  
Starting with some insights into the methodology and data employed in this analysis, 
the article then outlines the role of a board of directors and potential impact of interlocking 
directorships. The article will then provide brief contextual material on the evolution of 
Britain’s major financial institutions and their changing relationship with the rest of the top 
250 firms. These sections will highlight a series of questions that will be addressed when 
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examining each sample year, demonstrating how this research differs from other work on 
finance-industry links. Specifically, it is essential to explain how historians’ previous 
preoccupation with clearing banks needs to be moderated by incorporating an analysis of the 
many other financial institutions which participated in the British corporate network. 
Additionally, because these varied financial institutions were participating in British business 
as a collective and the networks they possessed through board-level interlocks dictated the 
movement of resources, both tangible and intangible, they became increasingly essential 
participants in British business, thus warranting further analysis. Secondly, these changes 
need to be linked with a significant shift in the patterns of ownership of major British 
business. Thirdly, one must assess the density and quality of connections within the British 
corporate network over time, identifying any changes that took place and the reasons behind 
them. Importantly, what this study provides is a unique survey of corporate connectivity 
across all sectors which can provide deep insights into inter- and intra-sectoral connectivity 
over most of the twentieth century. Through network graphs, this study offers the opportunity 
to visualise lines of communication and flows of resources across boards, industries and 
British business as a whole, something that has not been done before. More specifically, we 
highlight occurrences of regional clustering, recurring and ongoing relationships, cartelisation 
and industry preference amongst interlocks. At the centre of our study is a focus on finance-
industry relationships; by isolating the connections of each financial company in the network 
for each year, we are able to identify wider trends related to financial sector linkages and 
isolate potentially unique relationships for further study. While further research is required at 
the micro- level in order fully to understand the nature and impact of these changes on 
individual firms and the economy as a whole, this article provides a solid foundation on 
which to develop fresh perspectives on a range of issues related to the evolution of British 
business in the twentieth century. 
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Methodology and Dataset 
In this work, we adopt network visualisation and characteristic analysis as a novel approach 
to studying inter-organisational relationships. Understanding the shape, form and function of 
networks is important in understanding a host of characteristics of relationships which cannot be 
explained through other forms of organization (that is, markets, hierarchies or other empirically-based 
forms of analysis). Networks help one understand relationships which are not purely formalized, 
which cannot be predicted and which are likely to change over time. As there are different categories 
of relationships and indeed networks, certain networks provide answers to queries which others 
cannot. Networks can help us visualise lines of communication, relational contracts, 
syndicates/cartels/clusters and centres of influence. Visualising networks through graphs provides a 
whole picture which can be interpreted in numerous ways. Relationship characteristics can also be 
inferred from networks; aspects of relationships such as trust, commitment and reputation become 
clearer when visualising a node’s quantity and quality of connections. Networks visualised on a large 
scale also allow for the identification of potentially significant relationships for further investigation 
or case-study creation.  
Using aspects of network theory for an examination of inter-organisational networks is a 
tested method. John Scott, Mark S. Mizruchi and Beth A. Mintz and Michael Schwartz have shown 
the value in engaging in this sort of analysis and the opportunity it provides to isolate unique network 
features and distinctive trends.11 As Scott and Griff argue, ‘an adequate understanding of social 
networks … concerns itself with features of the network as a whole, rather than simply with direct 
contacts of a social agent’.12 Corporate networks from a national perspective have tended to favour 
examinations of the American or German systems.13 While Scott’s work on the British corporate 
network adds much to our understanding on inter-organisational relationships, his focus has primarily 
been on the post-war period (1950s-1980s) and on banks as the principal financial player within these 
networks. Our study intends to build on much of Scott’s work by extending the period of examination 
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back to 1904, highlighting changing inter-sectoral links and focusing in on all financial institutions, 
rather than just banks.  
The dataset used in this study has been compiled partially from pre-existing datasets, 
published sources such as Who’s Who in British Business, as well as archival sources such as stock-
exchange yearbooks, commercial providers and annual reports.  Any micro-level primary data 
presented has been collected from a number of banking and industrial archives, where available. We 
have utilised the network software Pajek to gauge centrality measurements and visualise network 
shape and structure. The selection and spread of benchmark years allows us to achieve a broad 
perspective on evolving trends in British inter-organisational relationships outside of conflict years, 
while also providing indicators of the changing business landscape. For example, 1904 reflects a 
period of growing bank concentration as well as the persistence of small Victorian firms. The second 
sample point, 1938, provides an example of a transitory period for the staple industries and one which 
may reflect the impact of the Macmillan report. The first post-war year, 1958, illuminates the British 
corporate network in a period of restrictive banking practices, but also during the beginnings of the 
market for corporate control. Finally, 1976 presents our data amidst an uncertain post-crisis period 
where policy was quickly changing and new financial players were taking on a greater role in British 
business. These sample years allow us to assess the network before and after stages of instability, 
crisis and transformation (i.e. merger waves, policy implementation, etc.), thereby revealing the 
impact of some of these events. In addition to this, selecting the top 250 companies by net assets 
allows us to view connectivity amongst the largest players in British business who had the status and 
capital to shape much of the business landscape through the twentieth century. 
We examine several different characteristics of the network. Firstly, the Freeman degree is 
used, allowing us to measure centrality and network density. This can indicate highly connected 
companies as well as the level of integration within the network as whole. In instances of high 
connectivity, it also allows us to determine the presence of a so-called ‘big linker’, that being an 
individual who held many board seats often in what is termed a ‘figurehead’ role.14 Secondly, we have 
also isolated the ties of each financial institution in the network to determine how integrated they were 
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in the network as a whole, as well as determine the nature of their connections, viz., were they largely 
inter- or intra-sectoral? Did they connect with many companies in the same industry? Were they 
connected to regionally significant companies, and finally, did these connections repeat in multiple 
benchmark years? These connections and the accompanying analysis provide a view of major changes 
in British business through an alternate and unique perspective, while also highlighting the 
opportunity for further research into particularly interesting clusters and other networked 
relationships.   
Role of the board and interlocks 
As this article will be focusing on large British companies, it is important from the outset to 
establish that the board of directors represented the key mechanism for corporate control.15 The key 
board functions included management, oversight and service.16 Consequently, its composition will 
reveal the company’s mode of control and whether this is shaped by what Scott refers to as a 
‘constellation of interests’,17 namely, senior executives, financiers, shareholders and non-executives 
from other industries.18 In the early-twentieth century context, at a time when as a direct result of 
merger activity many large-scale firms experienced significant growth,19 and board size was growing 
considerably20, its role was brought into sharp focus. Quail has demonstrated that while the 1908 
Companies Act provided greater clarification about the role of directors, and specifically recognised 
the existence of a managing director, boards were ‘increasingly becoming self-perpetuating 
oligarchies’.21 At the same time, share ownership in the largest companies was already highly 
dispersed, minimising the potential influence of owners, while shareholder attendance at company 
meetings was in decline.22 This resulted in the emergence of a ‘proprietorial’ structure which was 
intrinsically hierarchical, with the board of directors controlling all aspects of a company’s activities, 
even though they owned a tiny fraction of its equity. Moreover, these characteristics persisted well 
into the twentieth century. Hannah has described the inter-war era as ‘the golden age of directorial 
power’, while up to the 1970s only superficial changes took place in this respect, given the extensive 
adoption of a holding company structure across many sectors.23 This reinforces our earlier claim that 
an analysis of board composition provides a deep understanding of the nature of British corporate 
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decision-making over the period 1904-76, given the dominant role played by directors in fashioning 
corporate structure.   
While Cassis rightly argues that the impact of particular directors (and notably bank directors) 
on the boards of other companies varied and needs to be handled on an individual basis, by looking at 
the corporate network as a whole it is nevertheless possible to draw some conclusions.24 As an 
interlock represents an interest between two companies, it is safe to assume in most cases that when 
the director who works for a financial institution sits on the board of an industrial company this 
relationship was either a ‘capital relation’ or a ‘personal relation’, where personal includes figurehead 
directors who hold multiple seats and do so because of status and often access to important personal 
contacts.25 On the other hand, links between two financial companies are potentially even more 
complex, as they could either reflect financial interests or directors could have been placed there to 
monitor corporate behaviour, or again to act as a figurehead. Although boards impact on strategic 
decisions, determine capital flows and monitor the decisions of top management, the emphasis on 
each could shift depending on the board members’ prerogative.26 Board decisions could also 
determine objectives and ensure business operations are focused on achieving these objectives.27 
Furthermore, as Brayshay et al. argue: ‘Examination of interlocks provides an initial basis for 
analyses of how social networks may have influenced company activity’.28 Other directorships held 
by so-called ‘big linkers’ had the potential to influence the mode of decision-making or the 
accumulated knowledge they brought to a particular board. The various roles of directors and accrued 
benefits that come as a result of experience, contacts and access to capital could also be analysed 
within a resource-based view.29 Toms, Wilson and Wright, for example, examine the way in which 
inter-organisational networks in the private equity sector and beyond help corporations and boards to 
accrue ‘rents’ such as human capital and other resources.30 Outside of the interlock network, a 
director’s informal links to the business world via friendships, club membership, family associates 
and similar relationships also played a significant role in shaping their influence on a given board. In 
our sample, we discover a number of individuals identified as ‘big-linkers’ and whose presence on a 
given board would pertain primarily towards increasing status and visibility of the company. Table 1 
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details the number of directors with the highest number of board seats (ranging from four to seven) for 
each of the sample years, demonstrating that most were individuals with particularly high status in 
Britain.  
Table 1. ‘Big-linkers’ in each of the sample years  
 
 
From a non-figurehead perspective, Holmes and Ploeckl have shown that outside 
directors had the ability to submit proposals on subjects as diverse as restructuring, financial 
requirements, and mergers.31 For example, banks interlocked with one or more steel firms 
had the ability to propose amalgamation if one or all of the firms to which they were 
connected ran into problems, and especially those which accumulated excessive bank debt. 
Significantly, they argue that ‘networking between a bank’s clients and interlocking 
directorates with steel firms were two important conduits British banks could have used to 
shape industry concentration’.32 The proximity of banks to industry (particularly commercial 
banks and later other financial institutions) made a board-level connection between the two a 
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seemingly natural move. In an ideal situation, this would allow banks and other financial 
institutions to monitor advances and gain an understanding of firm capital requirements.33 In 
addition, as certain financial institutions started to act as financial advisors to industry in the 
post-war period, this relationship experienced a distinct intensification. This was especially 
true for London-based banks, because they knew little about the company to which they were 
loaning money, or indeed the industry as a whole. One of the ways directors sought to be 
actively involved in industrial firms was by acting as ‘delegated monitors’, which required as 
much information-gathering on the company as possible, while alternatively financial 
institutions could seek to appoint a non-executive director to the board of a given industrial 
company.34 For example, Lloyds did this with Consett Iron Co. in 1959.35 While most boards 
still reflected the ‘club atmosphere’ entrenched in the organisations centred on the City of 
London, the extent of the interlocks between financial and industrial companies increased 
significantly up to the 1970s, highlighting the need to examine the nature of this relationship 
and the cross-sectoral linkages. 
Finance and Industry in the twentieth century 
Before going on to conduct a detailed analysis of the database, however, and although 
an abundant literature exists to outline key developments, it would be useful briefly to 
provide a broader financial context in which the corporate networks operated.36 In particular, 
it is important to emphasise how by the start of the twentieth century the bulk of British 
financial activity was centred on the City of London. While provincial stock exchanges in 
Manchester and Glasgow continued to operate for several decades, once the banking sector 
had been centralized in London37 and the London Stock Exchange came to dominate the 
market for corporate ownership, British financial activities were largely controlled by the 
City of London.38 As British business was also increasingly dominated by merger activity, 
resulting in the creation of ever-larger firms in all sectors of the economy,39 it was apparent 
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that as Foreman-Peck and Hannah and Acheson et al. have shown, ownership was highly 
dispersed and separated from managerial control.40 While the many railway companies, 
clearing banks and utilities that dominated the Top 250 firms had since their origins been 
characterised by a divorce between control and ownership, the extensive merger activity in 
such areas as cotton textiles, engineering and steel resulted in similar trends.41  
A number of studies, including Acheson et al. and Cheffins, have demonstrated the 
dispersion of share-ownership in Britain prior to 1914. Shares were held by a broad spectrum 
of individuals, founding families and directors, as well as company customers or suppliers 
who maintained individual links to a given firm.42 From the inter-war era, it is noticeable that 
while individuals continued to own the bulk of traded shares, some types of financial 
institutions increased their holdings in UK companies. For example, insurance companies’ 
involvement in the corporate sector increased from 3% in 1913 to 20% by 1980, while 
pension funds held 28% by the latter date, providing them with the opportunity to claim a 
seat on other firms’ boards.43 This trend had earlier been prompted by declining investment 
opportunities abroad during the interwar years, while after 1945 the Bank of England and 
Treasury severely limited overseas activities, leading financial institutions to turn their 
attention to domestic business and stimulate the new issues market. Over this period, there 
was a significant transformation in individual holdings of the leading firms’ equity, a trend 
which accelerated from the 1960s. By 1980, individual holdings had fallen to 28% of quoted 
British equities, compared to 55% just fifteen years earlier. Although no succinct data exists 
for the whole of the twentieth century, research mentioned above on particular groupings of 
investors clearly indicate a move from dispersed share-ownership by individuals and small 
investors to more concentrated ownership in the hands of financial institutions. As a direct 
result of these changes, institutional investment vehicles such as pension funds, insurance 
companies and old players such as merchant banks who were taking on new roles as 
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investment advisors were becoming increasingly embedded in British business boardrooms, 
while investment activity in domestic industry by financial institutions other than banks was 
growing across the financial sector.44  
The debate relating to the impact of this relationship has raged throughout the 
twentieth century. On the one hand, as many financial institutions had failed to develop deep 
relationships with British industry, their capacity to influence strategy was limited.45 Tilba 
and McNulty have also emphasised the disengagement that characterised the relationship 
between institutional investors and the firms in which they invested millions of pounds.46 
From the inter-war era, given the acute difficulties experienced by staple industries such as 
textiles, coalmining, steel and shipbuilding,47 this led many to believe that British industry 
was in need of major restructuring.48 Specifically, there was a growing clamour in favour of 
financial institutions offering not only funds, but also advice and knowledge.49 The 
Macmillan committee set up to encourage bank involvement in the industrial sector and aid in 
its restructuring was but the most prominent of these voices.50 It is apparent, however, that 
while banks had actually been lending large amounts to industry in the form of overdrafts and 
other short-term instruments, little in the way of effective rationalisation occurred in the 
1930s.  As Garside and Greaves note, while there was some evidence of bank-led merger 
activity in Britain, the implementation of industrial rationalisation across industries suffering 
from decline (particularly cotton, coal and shipbuilding) was more evident in official 
documents than in practice.51  This lack of actual rationalisation activity re-enforced 
Hilferding’s thesis regarding the divergent interests of financial institutions and the needs of 
manufacturing industry.52 Indeed, as this paper will show, while financial institutions and 
industrial customers were increasingly involved in each other’s companies through board 
interlocks, there is little evidence of a deep understanding of respective needs. 
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As the general economic environment changed markedly after the 1940s, the post-
Second World War era was characterised more by a considerable deepening of the 
relationship between the financial and other sectors. Although between 1939 and the 1970s 
the Bank of England and Treasury placed strict requirements on banks regarding their 
liquidity, thereby constraining lending activity, their connections with British firms increased 
significantly over this period.53 For example, manufacturing took an increasingly large 
proportion of bank advances to industry in this period, rising from around 25% just after the 
war to 40% in 1966. Of course, much of this came as a result of lending controls put in place 
to promote stability and encourage domestic growth.54 At the same time, Thomas notes that 
industrial profits as a source of finance declined from 72% (1952-55) to 45% (1971-76), 
while external corporate funding grew from 12% to 20% between 1948 and 1976.55 As we 
have already noted, institutional investors were also investing an increasing proportion of 
their growing funds in British equities, significantly altering relationships across various 
sectors. Of course, given the continued debate about the alleged failure of British financial 
institutions to support domestic firms, it remains a matter of conjecture whether this deeper 
relationship resulted in improved performance, at a time when international competition was 
intensifying and technology was advancing rapidly in a wide range of industries. It is 
consequently necessary to examine the evidence on board interlocks in order to provide a 
useful indicator of the nature of this relationship, and especially assessing how the extent of 
these links changed over time.  
The corporate network, 1904-1976 
a. 1904 
The relationship between financial institutions and other large-scale companies 
changed through the twentieth century, mainly as a result of concentration in banking and 
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later in other sectors, alongside the influx of new financial players and a significant decline in 
the importance of foreign investment from the 1910s. At the start of the century, while a 
number of large centralised banks and transport companies had emerged, many companies 
still held on to the typical structure of a Victorian small-scale regional firm.56 This is further 
illustrated in the network diagram for 1904 (Figure 1), where although it is evident that some 
firms were interlocked, approximately 30% of the top 250 firms were isolated from the 
network. These peripheral firms included a number of smaller rail companies, brewers, textile 
manufacturers and dyers and many family-owned companies (for example, J & J Colman, 
Lever Brothers and Lipton Ltd.). This indicates that no particular industry was less likely to 
interlock at that time, or that it was merely family-held businesses that did not adopt this 
practice. Although financial institutions also appear on the periphery, only 14% had failed to 
build ties to the network, with non-bank financial institutions such as Royal Exchange and 
North British and Mercantile proving to be amongst the most connected (Table 1). The 
propensity for financial institutions to interlock compared to other companies appears to be 
linked to the monitoring of investments and loans as the principal motivation behind this 
activity, facilitated by the increase in board size arising from amalgamations. From figure 1, 
it is also apparent that there is a high number of marginal firms, those which possess limited 
ties to the network (one or two links); these firms make up approximately 34% of the 
network.  
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Figure 1. Corporate Network (Top 250 firms) in 1904 
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In terms of network centrality (see Table 2), the core of the network was occupied 
mainly by insurance companies (Royal Exchange Assurance, North and British Mercantile 
and London Assurance). Although bank concentration had already occurred, insurance 
companies appear in the network far more frequently, with interlocks concentrated in 
London. For example, North British and Mercantile were linked to a number of London rail, 
dock and financial companies, largely as a result of the growth of the insurance business in 
conjunction with the UK’s international shipping focus. This is further confirmed by the 
industrial concerns with which the most central insurance companies were interlocked, which 
were mainly shipping, dock and rail companies. Insurance companies were also largely 
interlocked with other financial companies, largely as a result of the long-established 
relationship between banks and insurance companies.  
Table 2. Top 25 most central companies in 1904 (according to Freeman Degree) 
Company name Freeman Degree 
Royal Exchange Assurance 13 
London & North Western Railway 12 
North British and Mercantile 11 
Forth Bridge Railway 10 
London & India Docks Company 10 
Sunderland Iron Ore 9 
London Assurance 9 
North Eastern Railway 9 
North London Railway 9 
London and County Bank 9 
Great Northern and Piccadilly Railway 9 
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Guest Keen Nettlefolds 9 
Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation 8 
Birkenhead Railway 8 
Union Bank of Australia 8 
Provincial Bank of Ireland 8 
Central London Railway 8 
Underground Electric Railways Company of 
London 
7 
London Joint Stock Bank 7 
Union of London and Smith's Bank 7 
Cunard Steamship 7 
London, Brighton & South Coast Railway 7 
Scottish Widows Fund Life Assurance 
Society 
6 
Schibaeff Petroleum 6 
London and Westminster Bank 6 
 
The most central banks in the 1904 network included London and County Bank, 
Union Bank of Australia and Provincial Bank of Ireland, again centring mainly on transport 
and dock companies. Beyond transport companies, a number of financial institutions 
maintained links with British colonial companies such as Consolidated Gold Fields of South 
Africa, La Capital Traction and Electric of Buenos Aires and South African Breweries.57 
Given this geographic spread, it is consequently not surprising to note that they were also 
linked to dock, steam-shipping and telegraph companies. These trends appear to be largely in 
line with the international focus of the British economy at this time. Colonial banks were also 
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linked to many large companies located in Imperial territories. For example, the Union Bank 
of Australia was interlocked with Australian-based companies such as Dalgety and Australian 
Pastoral. Individual directors played a significant role in the internationalisation of interlocks. 
In some cases, individual players bound boards together, such as Stanley Christopherson of 
London Joint Stock Bank, who was a director at Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa 
and had significant ties to that region. Other interests in Africa were associated with local 
opportunities which sparked the interest of London bankers, for example, the mining boom in 
South Africa at the turn of the century.58    
In the network as a whole, many financial institutions still appear to have had a 
regional focus to their interlocks. For example, the Commercial Bank of Scotland was linked 
to Scottish Widow’s Fund, Caledonian Railway, Highland Railway and Eastern Telegraph 
(whose chairman was the Glaswegian John Pender).59 Bank of Liverpool was tied to 
Liverpool-based Royal Insurance, Salt Union, Liverpool United Gas Light and Cunard 
Steamship. This trend is in line with recent findings regarding the geographic spread of 
shareholders and the continuation of region-specific, bank-industrial relationships, something 
which the more centralised City banks were unlikely to possess.60 On the other hand, Cassis 
argues that despite bank amalgamations, bankers from provincial banks involved in large-
scale mergers managed to retain these regional links.61 For example, John Spencer Phillips, 
chairman of Lloyds, was on the Board of Directors of Shrewsbury Gas Light Co due to a 
previous relationship formed when he had been a banker at Shrewsbury-based Beck & Co. 
(absorbed by Lloyds in 1880). Despite the continued absorption of smaller or private banks 
by the larger commercial banks through the first half of the twentieth century, many of the 
networks created by these smaller enterprises proved to be resilient.62 
Although the financial sector appears to have been the most interlocked, many of 
these interlocks remain intra-sectoral and primarily between banks and insurance companies. 
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The presence of bankers on insurance boards, and vice versa, was symptomatic of an old-
established relationship as the two industries had been linked for over a century.63 This 
board-level relationship allowed for a channel of advice regarding investments and technical 
issues connected to more practical, insurer-client relationships. As both banks and insurance 
companies continued to indulge in intense merger waves over the course of the twentieth 
century, these interlocks also multiplied, creating an intimate community within the City of 
London. On the other hand, it was not until later in the century that substantial links between 
City-based financial institutions and domestic industrial concerns emerged, especially with 
regard to staple industries such as coalmining, textiles and steel, largely because the latter 
continued to rely on regional sources of capital and they were slow to adopt amalgamated 
corporate structures.64 
b. 1938 
Amalgamations across all industries increased into the interwar period; in 1918 
especially, many financial institutions which appeared in the network in 1904 were taken 
over by larger banks; Parr’s Bank was amalgamated by London and Westminster, Capital and 
Counties Bank by Lloyds and London Joint Stock Bank by Midland.65 The Colwyn committee, 
convened in the same year, aimed to prevent the ‘Big Five’ from continuing this activity. 
However, in later years significant mergers still occurred amongst the smaller banks, for 
example, Manchester and Country Bank merged with District in 1934.66 As regional banks 
were absorbed into the City-based institutions, banks increasingly lost touch with their local 
industrial customers. At the same time, as Figure 2 reveals, there had been an increase in the 
overall number of interlocks in the corporate network by 1938. Brayshay et al confirm this 
trend by demonstrating an increase in interlocking between 1900 and 1929-30, resulting in a 
growing ‘mesh of intercorporate linkages between a small number of key directors’.67 
According to the corporate network data, only 19% of the top 250 companies remained 
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disconnected from the network (down from 30% in 1904), with the major clearing banks 
taking on a much more central role. Lloyds, Midland and Westminster noticeably increased 
their number of interlocks, significantly surpassing insurance companies which once 
occupied the core of the network. Although less dramatically, the percentage of marginal 
firms (those with one or two links) also decreased from 35% to 26%. The 1938 network 
graph (figure 2) while illustrating the persistence of isolated and marginal nodes, clearly 
shows a distinct move towards move towards network integration when compared with figure 
1. The core of the network itself was also considerably denser than it had been in 1904, with 
an average Freeman degree of 16.5, compared with an average of 8.9 in 1904. While some of 
this can be explained by the increase in average board size, it would appear that across the 
network banks were pursuing interlocks with numerous companies, especially in non-
financial sectors, as a direct result of the need to monitor more closely the financial 
performance of their clients at a time of acute economic uncertainty. On average, the distance 
between ties decreased considerably from 1904 and 1938, meaning fewer paths connected 
one firm to the next and there was a greater occurrence of nodes which connected multiple 
paths (in other terms, the betweenness centrality percentage is the highest in this year). 
Unsurprisingly, in this year we have the largest percentage of so-called ‘big-linkers’ with 
5.07% of all directors being considered as such. Increased concentration in the network could 
also have come as a result of particular shifts within the banking sector influenced by the 
aims of the Bank of England. Turner suggests that in the inter-war period the Bank of 
England encouraged a close-knit, non-competitive banking environment which created a 
highly cartelised structure amongst the City-based institutions.68 This trend also continued 
over the following three decades, with the Bank of England purposely limiting competition 
and restricting speculative investment activity.  
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Figure 2. Corporate Network (Top 250 firms) in 1938 
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Table 3. Top 25 most central companies in 1938 (according to Freeman Degree) 
Company name Freeman Degree 
Lloyds Bank 33 
Midland Bank 28 
London, Midland and Scottish Railway 24 
"Shell" Transport and Trading 22 
Great Western Railway 22 
Westminster Bank 18 
London and North Eastern Railway 18 
Venezuelan Oil Concessions 17 
Sun Insurance Office 16 
Cunard White Star 16 
Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial, and 
Overseas) 
15 
National Provincial Bank 14 
Barclays Bank 14 
Commercial Union Assurance 14 
Royal Exchange Assurance 14 
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation 13 
Martins Bank 13 
London and Lancashire Insurance 13 
Baldwins 12 
Guest Keen Baldwins Iron and Steel 12 
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Southern Railway 10 
Associated Electrical Industries 10 
Imperial Chemical Industries 10 
Imperial Smelting Corporation 10 
District Bank 10 
 
After the early-1930s crisis, it appears that many banks sought to monitor their 
industrial companies much more closely, particularly those which had been encountering 
difficulties. While in 1904 Lloyds was interlocked with both a small number of financial 
institutions, as well as railway companies and a utility (Bristol Waterworks), by 1938 it was 
interlocked with twenty-six non-financial companies, including some shipping and rail 
concerns and British Aluminium, Consett Iron, ICI, Welsh Associated Collieries, Imperial 
Smelting Corporation and two of the large Powell Duffryn companies (Steam Coal and 
Associated Collieries). The principal cause for this dramatic change in board connectivity, 
apart from the general increase in board size resulting from intense merger waves, was 
Lloyds’ continued absorption of regional banking companies. In 1910, Lloyds entered the 
south-west region through a merger with Devon and Cornwall Bank and acquired as many as 
400 new branches in their merger with Capital and Colonies Bank in 1918.69 Midland was 
also interlocked with many more industrial firms, such as ICI, English Sewing Cotton and 
Mitchells & Butlers, a prominent brewing company. Even less connected banks such as 
District Bank and Union Bank of Scotland were linked with industrial companies such as 
Colvilles, Lancashire Steel Corporation and Stewart & Lloyds, manufactures of steel tubes.  
While we have already noted the significance of merger activity in certain industrial 
sectors, and especially in cotton textiles, steel and coalmining industries, it is also important 
to add that financial institutions actually played a significant role in stimulating 
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amalgamations.70 In the case of steel, Holmes and Ploeckl have demonstrated that banks 
played a much larger role in rationalisation than previously thought.71 They argue that non-
executive bank directors on industrial boards often exercised decisive influence over 
corporate decision making. For example, Lord Pirrie of Midland Bank, who sat on the board 
of John Brown and Co. and Colvilles, submitted a scheme for amalgamation to the board. 
Beyond this, what the corporate network demonstrates is that by 1938 banks were playing a 
much larger role in many industrial sectors, and especially those considered to be in decline. 
While this interlocking activity could have been a direct response to the Macmillan Report, it 
is more likely that banks which had been lending large amounts to industrial companies 
would have wanted to protect and monitor their financial commitments. Board minutes from 
Lloyds in later decades detail the accounts of industrial customers, along with special reports 
concerning company performance72, demonstrating not only the importance of industrial 
lending to commercial bank business, but also the level of contact at board level between 
financial and industrial sectors.   
Of course, not all companies interlocked as readily as the large banks and some of 
their industrial customers. Most family-dominated firms were less likely to interlock in great 
numbers, or even at all. For example, in 1938 the family-owned firms of J & J. Colman 
(which was not interlocked at all in 1904), Rowntree, F. W. Woolworth and John Lewis & 
Co. possessed no link to the corporate network. Newly-emerged building societies also had 
limited or no connections to the network, aside from Leeds Permanent Building Society and 
Halifax Permanent Building Society, both of which possessed links to London and North 
Eastern Railway, National Provincial and Halifax-based knitted yarn company, Pattons & 
Baldwins. This disconnect was largely due to building societies being primarily lenders of 
capital for home-ownership, rather than lenders to industry.73 
c. 1958 
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In the post-war years, despite remaining integrated, the network’s core became 
slightly less dense, with an average Freeman degree of 13.8 and the percentage of firms with 
no connection to the network increasing to 25% (Figure 3 and Table 4). One of the main 
reason behind this decline was the late-1940s nationalisation programme which saw two of 
the most networked industries (railways and coal) up to 1938 (Tables 2 and 3) come under 
public ownership. In spite of being briefly in public ownership (1949-51), the steel industry 
was much better represented in the core than in previous years, with the inclusion of Vickers, 
John Brown & Co. and Steel Company of Wales. The positioning of Steel companies in the 
network suggests the privatisation of this industry along with the growing market for 
corporate control had direct implications for their connectivity in the network.74  In terms of 
sector-specific interlocks, John Brown & Co. shared ties to five financial institutions (all 
banks), Vickers to six (four banks and two insurance companies) and the Steel Company of 
Wales to three (all banks). This data also highlights the increased extent to which banks and 
insurance companies maintained their position as some of the most well-connected in the 
network. Related to this trend, the graph in figure 3 also demonstrates the increase in the 
number of marginal firms (up to 30% of the total), which consisted predominantly of non-
financials and was directly correlated to the propensity of financials in this year to maintain 
intra-sectoral ties.  
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Figure 3. Corporate Network (Top 250 firms) in 1958 
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Table 4. Top 25 most central companies in 1958 (according to Freeman Degree) 
Company name Freeman Degree 
Midland Bank Ltd 22 
Royal Exchange Assurance 22 
National Provincial Bank Ltd 21 
Lloyds Bank Ltd 20 
Vickers 15 
Barclays Bank Ltd 15 
Union Discount Company of London Ltd 15 
Westminster Bank Ltd 14 
Williams Deacon's Bank Ltd 14 
Royal Insurance Company 14 
P. & O. Steam Navigation Company 14 
Royal Bank of Scotland (The) 13 
Yorkshire Bank Ltd 13 
Bank of London & South America Ltd 13 
Cunard Steamship Company 12 
Dunlop Rubber Company 12 
District Bank Ltd 12 
Associated Electrical Industries 11 
Brown (John) & Co. 11 
National Commercial Bank of Scotland Ltd 11 
English, Scottish & Australian Bank Ltd 11 
Hudson's Bay Company 10 
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Imperial Chemical Industries 10 
Steel Company of Wales 10 
Commonwealth Development Finance 
Company 
10 
 
In terms of financial institutions’ aggregate number of links within the network, over 
the 1940s and 1950s there was an increase in the number of intra-sectoral ties, especially 
amongst smaller banks, trusts and insurance companies. Legal and General had ties to five 
financial institutions and only one industrial firm, while National Bank Ltd had ties to two 
financial institutions and no industrial links. Although it seems surprising that Yorkshire 
Bank had ties to thirteen financial institutions, including most of the ‘Big Five’ clearing 
banks, this arose from its recurring liquidity crises, prompting the Bank of England to 
encourage a syndicate of financial institutions to provide long-term support.75 The trend 
toward intra-sectoral connectivity can also be observed in the activities of the larger banks, 
and especially National Provincial, which while maintaining plentiful ties to industrial firms, 
in 1958 had ten links to other financial institutions, compared to four in 1938. The propensity 
to increase intra-sectoral links came from a distinct upward domestic turn in economic 
activity in the 1950s, encouraging a much more inward-looking, cartelised form of corporate 
behaviour. At the same time, it is also vital to remember that banks did not abandon their 
industrial sector links, because even though the bulk of industrial investment was sourced 
from profits in the early to mid-1950s, it was still important to monitor liquidity issues.76 
Furthermore, increased intra-sectoral connectivity amongst financial institutions led to greater 
collaborative activity between financials which on occasion was used to facilitate capital flow 
to struggling industrials.77 Thomas has also demonstrated that bank advances to industry, in 
particular to manufacturing, increased from the late-1950s, rising at an even greater rate in 
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the 1970s, highlighting the vital importance of this relationship.78 This was especially 
essential in high-technology family firms such as Ferranti, which had provided a directorship 
for its principal banker since a liquidity crisis in 1903.79 
Banks also appear to have maintained links to some of the same companies in 1938 
and 1958, suggesting a long-term relationship. Lloyds was linked with both Consett Iron and 
British Aluminium in these years, Westminster was linked with United Steel Corporation and 
British Match Company, and District Bank was linked to Turner & Newall and Lancashire 
Steel Corporation in both years.80 The board minutes for Turner Brothers Asbestos Limited 
provide detail of an ongoing and significant relationship with District Bank. This sustained 
interlock was undoubtedly a result of the long-term bank-industrial client relationship the two 
companies pursued. District Bank provided numerous accountancy and wage-related facilities 
to Turner Brothers which exemplify the intimate day-to-day relationship the two companies 
maintained. 81 Additionally, Sir Walker Shepherd who sat on the board of District Bank was a 
shareholder in Turner Brothers and thus had a vested interest in the company’s 
performance.82 Furthermore, Barclays, which had possessed a largely international focus in 
the inter-war years, in 1958 was tied to a number of British manufacturing firms such as 
Vickers and several financial institutions. This also undermines Coates’ claim that banks 
sustained a largely international focus and neglected domestic industry.83 Despite growing 
intra-sectoral links across the financial sector, it appears in the post-World War II era that 
banks had not abandoned their industrial board ties, maintaining a close relationship with a 
number of sectors such as steel, chemicals, textiles and tobacco.    
d. 1976 
As the need for external finance increased in the 1970s, largely because of 
intensifying international competition and a challenging domestic macro-economic climate 
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which included rising inflation, a secondary banking crisis and a collapse in property values, 
financial institutions increased their interlocked relationship with industrial companies.84 By 
1976, the core of the network had nearly returned to its pre-war density, with an average 
Freeman degree of 15.4, even though the number of financials in the core had declined from 
sixteen to thirteen. It is also clear from Table 5 that, with the exception of National & 
Commercial Banking and Bank of Scotland, banks in 1976 possessed more ties to industrial 
companies than other financial institutions, Lloyds, Midland, National Westminster and 
Barclays, accounting for four of the top five most-connected firms. Indeed, despite major 
changes in the financial sector in this decade, the role of commercial banks in the corporate 
economy remained relatively unchanged. That said, major instability within British business 
appears to have resulted in greater integration through the network as a whole. Although it is 
evident in the network graph in figure 4 that isolated firms persist, the number of marginal 
firms occupies a much smaller percentage of overall firms. The passing of the 1967 
Companies Act and major economic crises of the early-1970s had impacted upon many of the 
newer financial companies, prompting them to extend their links with other parts of the 
business world in order to monitor more closely their investments.85 At the same time, the 
introduction of Competition and Credit Control in 1971 removed restrictions on lending, 
stimulating an increase in advances by clearing banks to industry.86 Despite significant 
changes to banking and monetary regulations, as well as several post-War government 
reports on banking practice, commercial banks in these last three benchmark years (1938, 
1958 and 1976) appeared willing to connect and interact with industrial companies at board 
level.  
Having noted this significant conclusion, it is nevertheless essential to stress that the 
biggest change to the finance-industry relationships at this time was the increasing presence 
of institutional investors as stakeholders in industrial companies, with pension funds, 
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insurance companies and investment trusts significantly increasing their holdings of British 
equities. As we noted earlier, holdings by individuals had been in decline since the1950s, 
while by 1975 institutional investors owned over 50% of quoted British equities.87 In the 
network, along with new institutional investors such as Hill Samuel Group and significant 
financing house, United Dominions Trust, the older insurance companies Legal & General 
and Royal Insurance increased their non-financial ties significantly.88 Moreover, these non-
bank financial institutions were more entrenched in the financial sector than banks by the 
1970s. Another interesting development is the presence in the network of merchant banks (N. 
M. Rothschild and Lazard Bros.) and building societies (Abbey National and Woolwich 
Equitable Building Society), which developed primarily inter-sectoral ties to domestic 
industrial companies such as Northern Foods and Babcock & Wilcox. 
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Figure 4. Corporate Network (Top 250 firms) in 1976 
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Table 5. Top 25 most central companies in 1976 (according to Freeman Degree) 
Company name Freeman Degree 
Lloyds Bank 28 
Midland Bank 21 
British Petroleum 19 
National Westminster Bank 18 
Barclays Bank 18 
Commercial Union 18 
Finance For Industry  17 
Hill Samuel Group 16 
Delta Metal  16 
Tube Investments 15 
Imperial Chemical Industries 15 
Shell Transport & Trading 14 
Standard Chartered Bank 14 
Rank Organisation 14 
Eagle Star Insurance 14 
Royal Insurance 13 
Guardian Royal Exchange Insurance 13 
P & O Steam Navigation 12 
Lazard Brothers 11 
General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance 11 
Lucas Industries 11 
Dunlop Holdings 11 
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British Leyland 10 
Fisons 10 
Hawker Siddeley Group 10 
 
Conclusion  
This novel visual analysis of a unique corporate networks database has revealed 
several fresh aspects to the changing relationship between financial institutions and the rest of 
the top 250 British firms. Returning to the three issues highlighted in the introduction, it is 
firstly clear that business and banking historians need to broaden their ambit when assessing 
this relationship, in that a preoccupation with clearing banks fails to include the many 
different types of financial institution that became involved in the provision and management 
of corporate finance over the course of the twentieth century. As Ranald Michie’s latest book 
examining British banking in the long-run emphasises, it is essential to examine the 
complexity and variety of financial institutions within broad contexts.89 Of course, it is worth 
noting that in certain cases, such as Lloyds and Consett Iron, Westminster and United Steel 
Corporation and District Bank and Turner and Newall, the connections between clearing 
banks and other large-scale firms spanned multiple benchmark years, suggesting a long-term 
and strategically insightful relationship. Similarly, one should always remember that in the 
period covered by this article clearing banks provided the bulk of working capital for British 
business. On the other hand, increasingly institutional investors and other financial actors 
such as merchant banks (who acted as financial advisors to industry) became deeply involved 
in the corporate network, taking an increasing number of directorships. This process was 
undoubtedly linked with an analysis of the second issue, in that the ownership of the top 250 
companies moved from the preserve of individuals to a situation in which institutional 
investors such as insurance companies, pension funds and investment trusts dominated the 
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scene. Although as we have just noted that in 1976 clearing banks were the most central 
companies (see Table 5), by that time institutional investors owned over half of the quoted 
equity, compared to 28% for individuals. 
Having linked the first two issues, perhaps the third issue relating to the changing 
density of the British corporate network highlights a series of issues worthy of further 
research. Table 6 summarises these changes, indicating a tendency towards increased density. 
In this context, however, 1938 stands out as an aberration, with the lowest proportion of 
disconnected firms and highest Freeman index. Of course, in 1904 the corporate network had 
not developed very extensively, in spite of the extensive divorce between control and 
ownership amongst Britain’s largest firms.90 Nevertheless, it is still surprising to note that 
both indicators of density were higher in 1938 than any other sample year. This revelation 
can only be explained by both the acute interwar uncertainties affecting especially the staple 
industries (cotton textiles, coalmining, steel and shipbuilding) and the depth of the 1929-31 
economic crisis, persuading the clearing banks especially to increase their links with large-
scale firms (see Table 3). Moreover, as Tables 4 and 5 indicate, these links were sustained up 
to the 1970s. On the other hand, it is also noticeable that although institutional investors were 
relegated down Table 3, each of them had more interlocking directorships than in 1904. In 
certain respects, while this was certainly influenced by growing board size, when we 
highlight the actual composition of these ties they reveal the much closer relationship that 
financial institutions generally developed with large industrials from the 1920s. Another 
factor to bear in mind when emphasising the aberrant nature of the 1938 data in Table 6 is 
that as a direct result of the late-1940s nationalisation programme affecting coalmining and 
railways especially, some of the most connected sectors of the early-twentieth century were 
eliminated from the corporate network. 
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Table 6: The changing density of the British corporate network, 1904-76. 
 
Disconnected firms 
(%) 
Disconnected Financial Firms (as % of 
whole network) 
Average 
Freeman 
index 
1904 30% 3.20% 8.9 
1938 19% 2.80% 16.5 
1958 23% 2.10% 13.8 
1976 24% 1.20% 15.4 
 
Another important dimension of the changing density of the British corporate network 
is the nature of the linkages, in that Table 6 fails to indicate whether the links were intra- or 
inter-sectoral. While considerable attention has been placed on the connections between 
financial institutions and other large-scale British firms, it is worth remembering that the 
former were just as interested in extensive intra-sectoral linkages. As we noted earlier, there 
had since the early-nineteenth century been strong links between provincial clearing banks 
and insurance companies, largely because they were created and owned by similar groups of 
entrepreneurs. By the 1950s, however, most sectors within the financial sector had developed 
strong intra-sectoral links, at least partially stimulated by the Bank of England’s desire to 
create a highly cartelised structure that was regarded as more stable, a policy that remained in 
place until the early-1970s. At the same time, there is only limited evidence of intra-sectoral 
linkages in other industries, even though between the 1930s and 1960s many British 
companies were signatories to extensive trade association arrangements.  
The overriding conclusion from this research, however, is that there was an 
increasingly close relationship between financial institutions and the rest of the top 250 firms, 
as manifested in both changing ownership patterns, intra-sectoral support clusters and larger 
numbers of interlinking directorships. Moreover, these manifestations were directly 
connected, given the desire of clearing banks and other significant financial players to 
monitor the ever-larger sums of money that had either been lent or invested.  As Sue Bowden 
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suggests in a study of the crisis at Rolls Royce in the late 1960s, while shareholder exit was 
certainly apparent in this case, the community of financial institutions including merchant 
bank Lazards were instrumental in coercing change at this company.91 One must 
consequently regard financial intra-sectoral links as just as significant as finance and industry 
links to the shape and structure of British business.  Of course, it is difficult at this stage to 
assess what lessons historically we can learn from the actions and relationships of financial 
institutions, given the need for more extensive micro-level research in order fully to 
understand the nature and impact of these changes on individual firms and the economy as a 
whole. While the general impression arising from the literature on bank-industry relationships 
is largely negative, it would be essential to analyse the extent to which firms relied on this 
relationship, the nature of the advice provided by financiers sitting on their boards, and the 
impact these had on corporate performance. Network analysis and graph visualisations have 
allowed for the novel drawing out of some of these important relationships which could have 
significant implications for future research paths. This foundation has also allowed for the 
illumination of significant trends, for example, long-term industry-finance relationships, 
regional clusters and the prevalence of overseas companies in the network. By highlighting 
these relationships and trends, one can pinpoint areas in which archival research should be 
undertaken. Given the vast spread of business records through the UK and rest of the world, 
using the network to highlight firms, groups of firms or key relationships which were 
potentially significant can aid in narrowing archival searches. Additionally, it also provides 
indicators of industry-specific connectivity and change; while we have focused on industry-
finance links in this article, further studies may focus on specific sectors within the wider 
context of the network, such as retail, pharmaceuticals or automotive industries.  
Furthermore, this article has opened the door for further studies of other benchmark 
years, including those that stretch back in time and forward into more recent decades, 
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providing an even broader context for changing patterns in British business. Given the 
significant changes which have occurred in the British financial sector to the present date and 
the recent publications by John Turner and Ranald Michie, it might be timely to examine the 
corporate network in more current years.92 This article has laid important groundwork for a 
discussion of corporate connectivity, board-level interactions and the wider implications of 
inter-sectoral relationships, opening the door for future research into the intricate 
relationships between directors at board level and what implications these had for company 
strategy and performance over the short- and long-run.        
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